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Abstract
Metacognitive judgments of performance can be retrospective (such as confidence in past choices) or prospective (such as a
prediction of success). Several lines of evidence indicate that these two aspects of metacognition are dissociable, suggesting
they rely on distinct cues or cognitive resources. However, because prospective and retrospective judgments are often eli-
cited and studied in separate experimental paradigms, their similarities and differences remain unclear. Here we character-
ize prospective and retrospective judgments of performance in the same perceptual discrimination task using repeated
stimuli of constant difficulty. Using an incentive-compatible mechanism for eliciting subjective probabilities, subjects ex-
pressed their confidence in past choices together with their predictions of success in future choices. We found distinct
influences on each judgment type: retrospective judgments were strongly influenced by the speed and accuracy of the im-
mediately preceding decision, whereas prospective judgments were influenced by previous confidence over a longer time
window. In contrast, global levels of confidence were correlated across judgments, indicative of a domain-general overconfi-
dence that transcends temporal focus.
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Introduction
Humans possess robust metacognitive capacities to evaluate
their performance on various tasks and make predictions about
how such performance might alter in the future (Nelson and
Narens 1990; Metcalfe and Shimamura 1994; Koriat 2000).
Metacognitive evaluations are often studied by eliciting confi-
dence judgments. For example, a student may predict their suc-
cess on an upcoming exam by reflecting on their current level of
knowledge and preparation (a prospective metacognitive judg-
ment; P-metacognition). After taking the exam, the same stu-
dent may then estimate his or her grade before receiving
feedback (a retrospective metacognitive judgment; R-metacog-
nition). Metacognitive capacity – the extent to which judgments
track performance – is dissociable from first-order task perfor-
mance and associated with distinct neural substrates (see
Fleming and Dolan 2012; Pannu and Kaszniak 2005, for reviews).
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However, it is unknown whether prospective and retrospective
judgments draw on distinct or common resources.
Behaviorally, few studies have directly compared the accu-
racy of P- and R-judgments for the same task and stimulus ma-
terial. Carlson (1993) compared probability judgments made
about future and past events such as “What is the probability
that next (last) week IBM stock will finish the week higher than
it began the week?” He found that, when the same subjects
make both past and future judgments, the Brier score (a mea-
sure of probability judgment accuracy) was better for past than
future judgments. However, in this case the events to be judged
are external to the subject and not evaluations of self-
performance. Siedlecka et al. (2016) compared prospective and
retrospective judgments of performance while participants
solved anagrams. Participants rated their confidence that a par-
ticular word was the solution, either before or after their binary
response of “yes” or “no,” and before or after seeing the sug-
gested solution. Confidence ratings given after the decision
were more accurate than when ratings were prospective.
Morgan et al. (2014) showed that rhesus macaques were able to
make accurate confidence judgments – bets on performance –
both before and after responding to a delayed-match-to-sample
memory task, suggesting temporal flexibility in the use of confi-
dence responses in nonhuman primates. However in this study,
first-order performance also differed between the prospective
and retrospective judgment tasks, making direct comparison of
metacognitive accuracies difficult.
There is evidence for neural dissociations between P- and R-
metacognition (Chua et al. 2009; Fleming and Dolan 2012). For
example, Schnyer et al. (2004) found that damage to the right
ventromedial prefrontal cortex was associated with a decrease
in metacognitive accuracy for judgments about future recall
(feeling of knowing), but did not affect accuracy for retrospec-
tive confidence judgments. In contrast, Pannu et al. (2005) found
that patients with lateral frontal lesions were impaired on retro-
spective confidence judgments, but not judgments about future
task performance. Studies using functional MRI have shown
that prospective metacognition activates medial PFC (Schnyer
et al. 2004, 2005; Modirrousta and Fellows 2008), while retrospec-
tive metacognitive accuracy in a short-term memory task is cor-
related with rostrolateral PFC activity (Yokoyama et al. 2010). A
related line of research has demonstrated that post-decision
confidence judgments also recruit rostrolateral PFC (Fleck et al.
2006; Fleming et al. 2010, 2012).
Together these studies suggest that humans and nonhuman
primates have the capacity to make P- and R-metacognitive
judgments about the same stimulus material, and that
R-metacognition is typically more accurate than P-metacogni-
tion. However, it is clear that there are conceptual and method-
ological differences between different types of prospective
metacognitive judgment. For some prospective judgments, such
as a feeling-of-knowing, a specific representation of stimulus
strength is available (albeit perhaps weakly) to the system on
each trial. For other types of judgment, such as predicting one’s
success at a sporting event, judgments must instead be made
based on an aggregate likelihood of success, with little or no in-
formation pertaining to individual trials. Finally, compared to
P-judgments, R-judgments are able to draw on additional trial-
specific cues of response fluency, response identity and stimu-
lus type or difficulty, potentially explaining their increased ac-
curacy (Siedlecka et al. 2016). Thus, while previous studies have
quantified differences in R- and P-metacognitive accuracy, the
influence of different cues and their temporal dynamics (e.g.
the recent history of performance and confidence on the task)
on each judgment type have received less attention (Rahnev
et al. 2015).
The dissociations between P- and R-metacognition noted
above referred to metacognitive accuracy (or discrimination),
the extent to which moment-to-moment variations in confi-
dence track task performance. In contrast, bias (or calibration)
reflects the tendency to be over- or underconfident (Fleming
and Lau 2014). While metacognitive accuracy has been shown
to differ between tasks (Ronis and Yates 1987; Baird et al. 2013;
McCurdy et al. 2013; Fleming et al. 2014; Ais et al. 2016), perhaps
reflecting differences in the cues that subjects use to construct
their confidence in each domain, bias may be more stable, tran-
scending temporal focus: people have been found to have high
or low confidence in their performance, irrespective of task
(Ronis and Yates 1987; Pallier et al. 2002; Song et al. 2011; Ais
et al. 2016; Hollard et al. 2016). Several studies have found that
subjects are overconfident in their judgments (Lichtenstein et al.
1982; Baranski and Petrusic 1994; Camerer and Lovallo 1999;
Harvey 1997; Arkes 2001), but in some experiments underconfi-
dence is found (Dawes 1980; Bjorkman et al. 1993; Winman and
Juslin 1993). In particular, while overconfidence may be the de-
fault in more difficult tasks, underconfidence may appear for
easier tasks (Baranski and Petrusic 1994, 1995, 1999), a phenom-
enon known as the hard–easy effect (Gigerenzer et al. 1991).
In the present study, we set out to quantify influences on
prospective and retrospective judgments of self-performance.
We employed the same visual discrimination task for both judg-
ment types, thereby matching performance and task character-
istics across temporal focus. We elicited numerical probabilities
of success, allowing assessment of both overconfidence (bias)
and accuracy of confidence ratings. Retrospective ratings were
provided on every trial, whereas prospective judgments of up-
coming task performance were made every five trials, before
seeing the stimulus. By using repeated, similar stimuli of con-
stant difficulty, we allowed subjects to build up knowledge of
their own performance over time (Keren 1991). The elicitation of
subjective judgments was incentivized to ensure subjects
treated both prospective and retrospective judgments with sim-
ilar importance. To assess metacognitive accuracy, we calculate
both the area under the type 2 ROC and measures of probability
judgment calibration and discrimination (Fleming and Lau
2014). We hypothesised that P- and R-metacognitive judgments
would draw on separate cues, such as fluency for retrospective
judgments, and recent outcome history for prospective judg-
ments, and that metacognitive accuracy and calibration would
be greater for retrospective compared to prospective judgments.
In contrast, based on evidence that overconfidence is pervasive
and domain-general, we hypothesized that overconfidence
would be similar across the two judgment types.
Methods and Materials
Participants
The experiment was conducted in December 2012 at the
Laboratory of Experimental Economics in Paris (LEEP) of the
University of Paris 1. Subjects were recruited by standard proce-
dure from the LEEP database and gave written informed consent
to take part in the experiment. A total of 47 subjects (26 men; age
18–29 years, mean age, 22.1 years) participated in this experiment
for pay. The session lasted around 90 min and subjects were paid
on average e19.7. We excluded subjects from analysis due to in-
sufficient variation (SD < 0.02) of R-confidence (4 subjects) or P-
confidence (4 subjects) for estimation of metacognitive accuracy
(see below). The final sample included 39 subjects for analysis.
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Stimuli
The experiment was conducted using Psychophysics Toolbox
version 3 (Brainard 1997) running in Matlab. The stimuli con-
sisted of two circles with a variable number of dots in each cir-
cle. All dots were of the same size and the average distance
between dots was kept constant. One of the two circles always
contained 50 dots while the other contained 50þ c dots. The po-
sition of the target circle (on the left or right) was randomly cho-
sen on each trial. Before the experiment, we estimated the
value of c needed to obtain a success rate of 71% using a psycho-
physical staircase (Levitt 1971; see below). This dot difference (c)
was kept constant throughout the main experiment, such that
all trials were of equal objective difficulty. The position of the
circle containing the greater number of dots was randomly as-
signed to be on the left or right on each trial.
Task and procedure
Practice and thresholding
Subjects initially performed practice trials of the dots task with-
out confidence ratings, in which full feedback was given. We
used these trials to calibrate task difficulty. The calibration
phase used a one-up two-down staircase (Levitt 1971): after two
consecutive correct answers one dot is removed, and after one
failure one dot is added. We stopped the calibration after 30 re-
versals in the staircase, and the value of c was calculated as the
mean dot number across the two last reversals of the staircase.
Subjects then performed 20 trials of the task with confidence
ratings (20 R-confidence and 4 P-confidence ratings) with feed-
back both on their accuracy and on the results of the confidence
elicitation mechanism.
Experiment phase
The experimental design is summarized in Fig. 1A. Each trial
consisted of the following sequence. First two outline circles
(diameter 5.1) were displayed with fixation crosses at their
centers at eccentricities of68.9. The subject was free to initi-
ate the trial when they wished by pressing the “space” key on
a standard computer keyboard. The dot stimuli (diameter 0.4)
then appeared at random positions inside each circle for 700
ms, and subjects were asked to respond as to whether the left
or right circle contained a higher number of dots by pressing
the “f” or “j” keys, respectively. There was no time limit for re-
sponding. After responding subjects were asked to indicate
their level of confidence in their choice (R-confidence; 50% to
100% in steps of 10%), using the F5-F10 keys, again with no
time limit on the response. On every fifth trial, we asked sub-
jects first to give their level of confidence in getting the up-
coming trial correct (P-confidence; same scale as R-
confidence). No feedback was given following either choices or
confidence ratings. The experimental phase consisted of 200
trials. Each subject provided 200 ratings of R-confidence and
40 ratings of P-confidence.
Incentivization
Subjects were paid according to the accuracy of their stated con-
fidence. We incentivized confidence ratings using the probabil-
ity matching rule (Fig. 1B; see Massoni et al. 2014, for details).
This rule provides incentives for the subject to truthfully reveal
a subjective probability of success, p. For each trial, a random
number is drawn from 1 to 100 (l1). If p > l1, the computer
checks to see if the subject is correct. If the judgment is correct,
an additional 1 point is won; if incorrect, 1 point is lost. If p < l1,
a new random number is drawn, l2. If l2  l1, 1 point is won; if l2
> l1, 1 point is lost. The rule can be intuitively understood as fol-
lows. The higher the initial rating of p, the more likely the cor-
rectness of the decision will determine earnings. The lower the
rating, the more likely earnings will be determined by chance
(the second lottery). A particular rating value (e.g. 70%) thus re-
veals how subjects trade off a belief in their decision being cor-
rect against a randomly determined reward. Note that this
mechanism is a proper scoring rule and provides incentives for
a subject to reveal true beliefs regardless of his or her prefer-
ences. Specifically, the expected reward for this mechanism
with a subjective rating p and a probability of success s is
p þ1ð Þ  sþ 1ð Þ  1  sð Þ½  þ 1  pð Þ  þ1ð Þ  1þp2 þ 1ð Þ  1p2
h i
which is equal to 2ps p2 and achieves its maximum for p ¼ s.
Prior to the experiment, we explained various possible out-
comes to subjects together with their intuitive interpretation
until they understood how different rating strategies impacted
upon their potential earnings, how over- or underreporting con-
fidence would lead to nonoptimal payoffs, and why it is in their
financial interests to report their true beliefs. The final payment
comprised e5 for participation and the accumulated points paid
at the exchange rate of 1 point ¼ e0.15.
Data Analysis
Metacognitive bias and accuracy
We defined R-trials as those followed by a retrospective confidence
rating, excluding those immediately preceded by a prospective
confidence rating (160 trials per subject). The remaining trials were
P-trials (40 trials per subject), which were both preceded and fol-
lowed by confidence ratings. We did not analyze the retrospective
rating given on P-trials (R* in Fig. 1A) to ensure that any effects on
R-confidence could not be trivially explained by anchoring to the
immediately preceding prospective rating given on the same trial.
Global overconfidence (bias) was calculated by subtracting the
mean accuracy from the average confidence level for each trial
type. To estimate metacognitive accuracy (the degree to which par-
ticipants can discriminate their own correct from incorrect deci-
sions), we calculated the area under the type 2 ROC for each
judgment type (AUROC2; Clarke et al. 1959; Galvin et al. 2003;
Fleming and Lau 2014). We also considered that an optimal strat-
egy for prospective judgments in a stationary environment is to as-
sess the average rate of success, and specify this probability on
every trial. Thus prospective judgments may be well calibrated on
average, but fail to approach the trial-by-trial accuracy that is typi-
cally observed for retrospective judgments. To address these short-
comings of the signal detection approach, we complemented
AUROC2 with a well-studied metric of forecasting accuracy, the
Brier score, which assesses the squared difference between the
confidence rating c and decision accuracy o (where o ¼ 1 or 0 for
correct or incorrect decisions):
BS ¼
X
i
oi  cið Þ2:
As the Brier score is an “error” score, a lower value is better.
We can further decompose the Brier score into the following
components (Murphy 1973):
BS ¼ Oþ C D;
where O is the “outcome index” and reflects the variance in per-
formance: O ¼ oð1  oÞ; C is “calibration,” the goodness of fit be-
tween probability assessments and the corresponding
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proportion of correct responses; and D is “discrimination” or
“resolution,” the variance of probability assessments.
Calibration is calculated as follows:
C ¼ 1
N
XJ
j¼1
Nj cj  oj
 2
:
where j indicates each confidence-rating bin and N is the num-
ber of trials. Calibration quantifies the discrepancy between the
mean performance level at each scale step (e.g. 60% correct) and
its associated confidence level (e.g. 80%), with a lower discrep-
ancy giving a better score. In contrast, discrimination (D) is a
measure of the variance of probability assessments, and quanti-
fies the extent to which correct and incorrect answers are as-
signed to different probability categories (equivalent to a
probability judgment analog of a gamma correlation, or
AUROC2). Here we used the adjusted normalized discrimination
index (ANDI) suggested by Yaniv et al. (1991), which provides a
proxy for the confidence–accuracy relationship normalized by a
participant’s performance level and by the range of confidence
ratings used. The first step in computing ANDI is to compute
the normalized discrimination index, NDI:
NDI ¼
1
N
PJ
j¼1
Njðoj  oÞ2
varðoÞ ;
where o is a vector of success or failure (1 or 0), J indicates the
number of confidence levels used by the subject, and N is the
number of trials. The adjusted NDI corrects for the bias intro-
duced by the number of judgment categories used:
ANDI ¼ N:NDI  Jþ 1
N Jþ 1 :
We assessed the relationship between our measures of P-
and R-metacognition (bias, AUROC2, calibration, and ANDI) us-
ing Pearson’s product–moment correlations. Mean values of
these scores were compared across judgment type using paired
t-tests.
Hierarchical mixed-effects models
We examined trial-by-trial influences on R and P-confidence
judgments using hierarchical mixed-effects models (using the
ME package in STATA). These models allow an estimation of
lagged factors with random intercepts and slopes at the individ-
ual level. We considered four candidate models of R-confidence
and P-confidence.
Observed R-confidence, R(t), and P-confidence, P(t), were as-
sumed to be related to current accuracy, O(t), and reaction time
RT(t), past confidence, R(t-i) and P(t-i), and past accuracy, O(t-i).
We included lagged factors modeling the influence of the previ-
ous trials. The window selected for these predictors followed
the frequency of P-confidence judgments (which occurred every
five trials); thus we included the previous five outcomes, the
A
B
Lose
x 40
R R R R P R*
R trials P trial
Figure 1. Experimental design. (A) The task consisted of a series of dot-density discrimination judgments followed by retrospective confidence
ratings (R) on every trial. Prior to every 5th trial, subjects also made a prospective prediction of their accuracy (P). Retrospective judgments pro-
vided immediately after a prospective rating (R*) were excluded from further analysis to avoid anchoring effects. (B) A schematic of the proba-
bility matching mechanism used to elicit subjective probabilities. This rule provides incentives for the subject to truthfully reveal a subjective
probability of success, p. For each trial, a random number is drawn from 1 to 100 (l1). If p > l1, the computer checks to see if the subject is cor-
rect. If the judgment is correct, an additional 1 point is won; if incorrect, 1 point is lost. If p < l1, a new random number is drawn, l2. If l2  l1, 1
point is won; if l2 > l1, 1 point is lost. The higher the initial rating of p, the more likely earnings are determined by the correctness of the deci-
sion rather than by chance alone.
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previous four R-confidence judgments and the previous P-confi-
dence judgment. We compared the following models:
R tð Þ or PðtÞ ¼ b0 þ b1O tð Þ þ b2RT tð Þ þ  (1)
R tð Þ or PðtÞ ¼ b0 þ b1O tð Þ þ b2RT tð Þ þ b3P t 5ð Þ
þ
X4
i¼1 b3þi Rðt iÞ þ 
(2)
R tð Þ or PðtÞ ¼ b0 þ b1O tð Þ þ b2RT tð Þ þ
X5
i¼1 b2þi Oðt iÞ þ  (3)
R tð Þ or PðtÞ ¼ b0 þ b1O tð Þ þ b2RT tð Þ
þ b3P t 5ð Þ
X4
i¼1 b3þi R t ið Þ þ
X5
i¼1 b8þi Oðt iÞ þ 
(4)
R tð Þ or P tð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1O tð Þ þ b2RT tð Þ þ b3R t 1ð Þ þ : (5)
For both R- and P-judgments, our regression models assume
that current confidence is related to objective features of the de-
cision (accuracies and reaction times) and/or previous subjec-
tive ratings. To identify the best-fitting models we computed
information criteria. Bayesian information criterion (BIC;
Schwarz 1978) scores were compared at the group level using
Kass and Raftery’s grades of evidence (Kass and Raftery 1995).
The difference in BIC provides support for one model against
another with the following grades: none for a negative differ-
ence; weak for a value between 0 and 2, positive between 2 and
6; strong between 6 and 10; and very strong for a difference
greater than 10. We additionally computed the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC, Akaike 1974) which penalizes the
number of parameters less strongly (Vrieze 2012).
Learning models
To complement our regression analyses, we examined whether
past successes and/or previous confidence ratings affected sub-
sequent P-confidence within a reinforcement learning frame-
work (Sutton and Barto 1998). These models are convenient
tools to analyze how individuals learn predictions over time
through trial and error (see Daw 2011; Niv 2009, for reviews). We
specified the relationship between reported P-confidence (PobsÞ
and predicted P-confidence (P^) by the following regression equa-
tion: Pobs ¼ b0 þ b1P^ þ ; with  following a Normal distribution.
P^ was generated from different candidate learning models:
(A) Objective Model:
P^ tþ 1ð Þ ¼ P^ tð Þ þ a O tð Þ  P^ðtÞ
h i
:
(B) Subjective Model:
P^ tþ 1ð Þ ¼ P^ tð Þ þ a R tð Þ  P^ðtÞ
h i
:
Both models assume that P-confidence at t þ 1 is related to
its value on the previous trial t. In addition, both models com-
pute a “prediction error” (in square brackets), which is the dif-
ference between either the obtained outcome, O tð Þ, and
previous P-confidence (in Model A), or the current trial’s R-con-
fidence and previous P-confidence (in Model B). The prediction
error can thus be thought of as driving the update of subsequent
P-confidence, with the magnitude of this update being con-
trolled by the free learning rate parameter a: Model (A) only
takes into account objective success and thus the prediction er-
ror is affected by the accuracy of previous trials, O tð Þ, as in stan-
dard RL models (Sutton and Barto 1998). Model (B) instead
computes a prediction error based on subjective ratings of per-
formance (Daniel and Pollman 2012; Guggenmos et al. 2016): the
difference between previous P- and R-confidence. We addition-
ally compared each model to a null (intercept-only) model in
which P^ remained constant across trials.
In all models P^ was initialized to 0.75. Best fitting parameters
were obtained by minimizing the error term in the regression
equation above using a nonlinear optimization routine in
Matlab (fminsearch). Predicted P^ values obtained from the best-
fitting parameters for each subject could then be compared
against the observed P-confidence on a trial-by-trial basis. The
log-likelihood of each subject’s P-confidence ratings under each
candidate model was entered into the following equation to ob-
tain a BIC score (where L ¼ the log-likelihood, k ¼ number of
free parameters, n ¼ number of observed P-confidence ratings):
BIC ¼ 2  lnLþ k  lnn:
Results
Subjects completed 200 trials of a visual discrimination task in
which task difficulty remained constant across trials (Fig. 1).
Each trial was followed by a retrospective confidence judgment
(R-trials), and every 5th trial was preceded by a prospective con-
fidence judgment (P-trials). Task performance on P-trials (mean
66.8%, SD 10.1%) did not significantly differ from performance
on R-trials (mean 67.2%, SD 7.0%; t(38)¼ 0.33, P ¼ 0.74). The dis-
tribution of confidence ratings given for each judgment type is
shown in Fig. 2.
Bias and calibration
We first examined subjects’ global level of overconfidence for each
judgment type by computing the difference between average confi-
dence and average performance. In these analyses, we excluded
one subject with an extreme prospective calibration score that can
be seen in the scatter plot in Fig. 3D. Consistent with a large body
of literature (Baranski and Petrusic 1994; Harvey 1997; Arkes 2001),
subjects were systematically overconfident for both prospective
(one-sample t-test against zero, t(38) ¼ 3.27, P < 0.01) and retro-
spective (one-sample t-test against zero, t(38) ¼ 7.13, P < 10 7)
judgments (Fig. 3A). Furthermore, this overconfidence was stable
across judgment type: there was no significant difference between
prospective and retrospective overconfidence (Fig. 3A; t(38) ¼ 1.63,
P ¼ 0.11), and both measures were correlated across subjects (Fig.
3B; r ¼ 0.43, P ¼ 0.007). Together these results indicate that global
overconfidence (bias) in decision-making transcends the temporal
focus of judgments of performance.
Within each judgment type, we additionally quantified the dis-
crepancy between mean performance level at each scale step (e.g.
60% correct) and its associated confidence level (e.g. 80%), with a
lower discrepancy giving a better calibration score. Retrospective
calibration was significantly better (lower) than prospective calibra-
tion (Fig. 3C; t(37)¼ 2.49, P¼ 0.017), although unlike for global over-
confidence, calibration was not significantly correlated across
subjects (Fig. 3D; r¼ 0.22, P¼ 0.19).
Metacognitive sensitivity and discrimination
We next considered metacognitive sensitivity – the ability to
track changes in performance with changes in confidence
(measured as the area under the type 2 ROC; AUROC2). R-meta-
cognitive sensitivity was systematically higher than P-metacog-
nitive sensitivity (Fig. 4A; t(38) ¼ 5.77, P < 0.001), and these
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measures were not significantly correlated across subjects (Fig.
4B; r ¼ 0.25, P ¼ 0.13). Indeed, prospective judgments did not
carry reliable information about subsequent accuracy, with
AUROC2 being statistically indistinguishable from 0.5 (t(38) ¼
0.42, P ¼ 0.68). The same pattern remained for an alternative
measure of metacognitive sensitivity derived from the forecast-
ing literature (ANDI; Yaniv et al. 1991). P-ANDI was systemati-
cally lower than R-ANDI (Fig. 4C; t(38) ¼ 7.03, P < 10 7), and
these measures were not significantly correlated across subjects
(Fig. 4D; r ¼ 0.26, P ¼ 0.11).
Formation of subjective ratings
The previous analyses indicate that while global confidence lev-
els transcend prospective and retrospective ratings, prospective
judgments of performance show markedly lower calibration
and sensitivity to local fluctuations in performance. This is con-
sistent with subjects monitoring trial-specific decision accuracy
post-decision, while leveraging long-run performance estimates
to construct prospective judgments. We next investigated how
subjects form prospective and retrospective ratings during the
task. For instance, we might expect a prospective judgment of
Figure 2. Histogram of frequency of confidence rating use for retrospective and prospective judgments. Error bars reflect standard errors of the
mean.
Figure 3. Comparison of confidence levels for prospective and retrospective confidence judgments. (A) Global overconfidence (mean confidence
– mean performance) for prospective and retrospective judgments (B) Relationship between prospective and retrospective overconfidence
across subjects. (C and D) As for (A and B), but for calibration, where a lower calibration score indicates that confidence levels are closer to
objective performance. The dotted regression lines in (B) and (D) are computed after omitting the outlying data point. *P < 0.05; n.s., not
significant.
6 | Fleming et al.
 by guest on O
ctober 11, 2016
http://nc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
performance to be based on past experience of the task. If you
have been successful in 7 out of 10 previous trials, it is sensible
to predict a 70% chance of success for the subsequent trial – and
in a stationary environment in which task difficulty remains
constant (as in the current experiment), such a strategy will
lead to reasonable forecasts. However, previous studies have
shown that subjects do not show optimal learning even in sta-
tionary environments, and instead are prone to biases such as
the hot-hand fallacy (where a win leads to an inflated prediction
of success on the next trial; Ayton and Fischer 2004; Oskarsson
et al. 2008). We might therefore expect that the value of P-confi-
dence depends on recent performance, and that either objective
aspects of previous task performance (such as accuracy) and/or
previous confidence ratings will affect subsequent prospective
judgments.
We used hierarchical mixed models (see “Materials and
Methods” section) to estimate the effects of previous ratings
and previous accuracy on the formation of both R- and
P-confidence. Tables 1 and 2 show the regression coefficients
for different models of R and P-confidence, and Fig. 5 plots the
coefficients from the full model. We found significant influen-
ces of current-trial accuracy and reaction time on R-confidence,
with faster and more accurate decisions being associated with
greater confidence. For lagged factors, the previous trial’s
R-confidence had an effect on current-trial confidence in Model
2, whereas previous accuracy did not have an effect. For R-confi-
dence, both BIC and AIC scores provided very strong support for
Model 5, which included only current-trial predictors (RT and
accuracy) and the immediately preceding R-confidence judg-
ment. In contrast, in models of P-confidence, we found a signifi-
cant dependence on the previous level of P-confidence, as well
as previous ratings of R-confidence over the previous four trials.
Previous accuracy had a weaker effect, especially when control-
ling for previous R-confidence (Model 4). The BIC scores pro-
vided very strong support for Model 2, which included
predictors for previous R- and P-confidence, over the next best
Model 4 which included all predictors. However, a comparison
of AIC scores revealed inconclusive evidence (DAIC< 3) for
Model 4 over Model 2, indicating that the difference in BIC is pri-
marily driven by the penalization for model complexity.
In summary, when comparing prospective and retrospective
judgments, we found that R-confidence is strongly influenced
by features of the current and immediately preceding decision,
whereas P-confidence showed a dependence on past confidence
extending back over a longer time window (the past four R-con-
fidence ratings and previous P-confidence).
To complement our regression analyses, we fit reinforcement
learning models to P-confidence judgments that updated predic-
tions of performance using either previous outcomes or subjec-
tive ratings (Sutton and Barto 1998; see “Materials and Methods”
section). Model A updated P-confidence based on previous suc-
cesses and failures, whereas Model B updated P-confidence based
on previous subjective ratings. Both models outperformed a null
intercept-only model that did not allow P-confidence to adapt as
a function of past experience (differences in group BIC score >
100). The learning rate parameter (alpha) in both models was
similar (Model A: mean alpha ¼ 0.20; Model B: mean alpha ¼
0.23; paired t-test, t(38) ¼ 0.63, P ¼ 0.53). The fits of each candi-
date model for three example subjects is shown in Fig. 6. By com-
paring model fits at the group level using a Bayesian random-
effects model selection algorithm (Stephan et al. 2007), we found
that Model B provided the best account of subjects’ data
Figure 4. Comparison of prospective and retrospective metacognitive sensitivity. (A) AUROC2 for prospective and retrospective judgments. (B)
Relationship between prospective and retrospective AUROC2 across subjects. (C and D) As for (A and B), but for the ANDI. **P < 0.001.
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(exceedance probability ¼ 0.98). Together with our regression
analyses, these model fits indicate that prospective predictions of
performance are themselves influenced by recent retrospective
confidence, over and above effects of objective accuracy.
Discussion
Here we directly compared prospective and retrospective meta-
cognitive judgments of performance in the same visual discrim-
ination task in which difficulty remained constant across trials.
In line with our hypothesis we found that, despite retrospective
judgments having access to additional trial-specific informa-
tion, participants’ global confidence levels generalized across
judgment types. This finding is consistent with a global level of
confidence being a stable individual difference that may gener-
alize across different task contexts (Ais et al. 2016). We also
found that retrospective judgments exhibited greater accuracy
and calibration compared to prospective judgments. This
increase in accuracy is likely due to retrospective judgments
having additional access to the internal state of evidence sup-
porting a particular choice, rather than only the aggregate
likelihood of success (Pouget et al. 2016). In turn, trial-to-trial
stimulus variation (such as changes in dot position) may be a
potential source of fluctuation in internal sensory evidence. In
line with this interpretation, we found that local variables such
as current-trial accuracy and response time predicted retrospec-
tive judgments of confidence. This is compatible both with
theories of metacognition that emphasize the importance of
trial-by-trial inferential cues when judging confidence (Koriat
1993, 2007), such as response fluency (Alter and Oppenheimer
2009), and computational perspectives that emphasize a contin-
uous tracking of the evidence in favor of a decision (Vickers
1979; Kiani et al. 2014). Intriguingly, a recent study found a boost
in accuracy for retrospective compared to prospective judg-
ments even when trial-specific stimulus evidence was available
in both cases (Siedlecka et al. 2016), suggesting that the simple
act of making a response may provide a further cue to improve
metacognitive accuracy.
In contrast, prospective judgments require learning about
the overall task difficulty (which was kept constant in this
experiment) in order to predict success on an upcoming trial.
Figure 5. Regression coefficients predicting R-confidence (left panel) and P-confidence (right panel) from features of previous trials. Coefficients
are extracted from the full model (Model 4) including all predictors to facilitate comparison across judgment type. P¼P-confidence; R¼R-confi-
dence; o¼outcome; RT¼ response time. Lag into the past is indicated by increasing indices (e.g. R-2 indicates the R-confidence judgment
made two trials previously). See Tables 1 and 2 for full details.
Table 1. Hierarchical linear regressions of R-confidence on past and
present accuracy, past R-confidence, and reaction time. Lag into the
past is indicated by increasing indices (e.g. R-confidence_2 indicates
the R-confidence judgment made two trials previously).
R-confidence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
accuracy 0.0394** 0.0396** 0.0394** 0.0395** 0.0397**
accuracy_1 0.0024 0.0022
accuracy_2 0.0027 0.0004
accuracy_3 0.0024 0.0013
accuracy_4 0.0010 0.0011
accuracy_5 0.0018 0.0025
R-confidence_1 0.1309** 0.1325** 0.1428**
R-confidence_2 0.0099 0.0100
R-confidence_3 0.0004 0.0015
R-confidence_4 0.0081 0.0073
P-confidence_1 0.0396 0.0379
RT 0.0588** 0.0624** 0.0587** 0.0624** 0.0584**
Intercept 0.8337** 0.7052** 0.8336** 0.7078** 0.7212**
AIC 8551 8545 8553 8555 8697
BIC 8504 8431 8499 8468 8636
The AIC and BIC score for each model is provided.
**P < 0.001.
Table 2. Hierarchical linear regressions of P-confidence on past accu-
racy, past R-confidence, and past P-confidence. Lag into the past is
indicated by increasing indices (e.g. R-confidence_2 indicates the R-
confidence judgment made two trials previously).
P-confidence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
accuracy 0.0003 0.0017 0.0008 0.0009 0.0001
accuracy_1 0.0142** 0.0084
accuracy_2 0.0143** 0.0075
accuracy_3 0.0030 0.0011
accuracy_4 0.0024 0.0002
accuracy_5 0.0058 0.0073
R-confidence_1 0.1206** 0.1167** 0.1564**
R-confidence_2 0.1041** 0.1003**
R-confidence_3 0.0529** 0.0541**
R-confidence_4 0.0375* 0.0365*
P-confidence_1 0.1820** 0.1790**
RT 0.0016 0.0004 0.0014 0.0004 0.0007
Intercept 0.7481** 0.3633** 0.7208** 0.3539** 0.6254**
AIC 3304 3585 3333 3587 3411
BIC 3267 3542 3290 3517 3363
The AIC and BIC score for each model is provided.
**P < 0.001;
*P < 0.05.
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Our regression models reveal a differential influence of past
confidence on P- and R-judgments: P-confidence was influ-
enced by past R-confidence over a longer time-window,
whereas R-confidence exhibited a dependence only on the last
rating. Nevertheless, we observed a reasonably high learning
rate (alpha  0.2) for the integration of previous retrospective
confidence judgments into a prediction of P-confidence. This
recency effect is suboptimal in a stationary environment in
which subjects should predict confidence in an upcoming deci-
sion based on their long-run experience with the task, rather
than immediately preceding outcomes, but is consistent with
findings of strong sequential dependencies in confidence
reports (Rahnev et al. 2015). However, we note that some sub-
jects did exhibit above-chance prospective metacognitive sensi-
tivity. One alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanation
for this variability is that some subjects exhibit a “self-fulfilling
prophecy.” Having rated high confidence, one might then
devote greater attention and focus to the subsequent trial such
that one’s confidence is justified. In line with this interpreta-
tion, Zacharopoulos et al. (2014) showed that biasing confidence
levels with false feedback had a positive effect on future task
performance. Future studies are required to distinguish
between these perspectives on the accuracy of prospective judg-
ments, for instance by asking whether the presence or absence
of prospective judgments affects features of individual
decisions.
There is increasing recognition in the neurosciences that the
brain may use a common schema for trial-and-error learning
about different aspects of the environment (see Niv 2009, for a
review). This class of reinforcement learning algorithms has
been successfully applied to explain behavior and neural
responses when learning about rewards and punishments
(O’Doherty et al. 2003; Daw et al. 2006), social reputation
(Behrens et al. 2008), and during interactive games (King-Casas
et al. 2005; Hampton et al. 2008). More recently, these models
have also been applied to explain changes in metacognitive var-
iables such as subjective confidence in the absence of explicit
feedback (Daniel and Pollmann 2012; Guggenmos et al. 2016).
Here we provide initial evidence that subjects’ prospective judg-
ments of performance can also be modeled as a trial-to-trial
update based on previous subjective confidence. Specifically, a
model in which prospective judgments of performance are con-
structed from local fluctuations in recent retrospective confi-
dence provided a better fit to the data than one in which
predictions were built from outcomes (objective accuracy)
alone. How these simple learning mechanisms may affect
metacognitive accuracy remains an important question for
future study. (We checked for correlations between individual
differences in prospective calibration, ANDI and AUROC2 with
the best-fitting parameters of Model B but did not find any sig-
nificant associations (P > 0.05).)
It is perhaps more striking that bias, or overconfidence, is
stable across prospective and retrospective judgments. There
are a number of previous accounts of overconfidence. The eco-
logical perspective proposes that overconfidence is due to a
biased retrieval of heuristic cues when answering general
knowledge questions (Gigerenzer et al. 1991). However, this
model cannot account for systematic overconfidence when
evaluating performance on perceptual discrimination tasks
such as the one used here. An alternative proposal is that sto-
chastic sampling of evidence leads to overconfidence (Erev et al.
1994; Merkle and Van Zandt 2006). However, here we find stable
overconfidence not only for post-decision assessments that are
naturally accommodated by an evidence accumulation frame-
work (Merkle and Van Zandt 2006; Pleskac and Busemeyer 2010)
but also for prospective assessments of performance that may
rely on distinct mechanisms. Our result is instead consistent
with previous findings that overconfidence reflects a stable trait
that transcends particular judgment types (West and Stanovich
1997; Kelemen et al. 2000; Ais et al. 2016), and that is potentially
distinct from variability in metacognitive accuracy (Thompson
and Mason 1996; Fleming and Lau 2014; Ais et al. 2016). Our find-
ing that sequential dependencies exist between retrospective
and prospective judgments of performance provides one poten-
tial explanation for why stable overconfidence is maintained
across temporal focus.
More broadly, our study raises the question of the appropriate
generative model for prospective and retrospective metacognitive
judgments. Recent progress has been made in understanding the
computational basis for retrospective judgments of decision confi-
dence (Galvin et al. 2003; Pleskac and Busemeyer 2010; Maniscalco
and Lau 2012; Pouget et al. 2016). On a signal detection model,
Figure 6. Models of P-confidence updates. (A) Fits of each candidate
learning model to data from three example subjects. The blue lines
show subject ratings of P-confidence; the red lines show model fits.
(B) Difference in BIC scores for Models A and B for each subject. A dif-
ference in BIC of 6 or more is considered strong evidence in favor of
a particular model. By comparing model fits at the group level using
a Bayesian random-effects model selection algorithm (Stephan et al.
2007), we found that Model B provided the best account of subjects’
data in the group as a whole (exceedance probability ¼ 0.98).
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confidence is computed by comparing an internal (perceptual,
mnemonic) signal to a criterion and then further processed as an
explicit metacognitive report. However, this model is limited to
designs in which metacognitive judgments are elicited after the
first-order task has been completed, and would appear difficult to
extend to prospective judgments such as judgments of learning
(Arbuckle 1969). In the present study, subjects were asked to make
prospective judgments of how likely they were to succeed on a
subsequent trial. Information about future success can be garnered
from previous experience, and it would be of interest to extend cur-
rent models of metacognition to encompass learning over one’s
past performance as a relevant internal signal for confidence. On a
practical level, SDT measures of metacognition are still likely to be
useful for analyzing prospective judgments, as they naturally sepa-
rate sensitivity from bias (over- or underconfidence).
We close with some limitations of the present study. Several
trials are needed to get robust estimates of AUROC2, and in our
dataset the number of P-trials is low. However, we note that the
same conclusions hold when using an alternative measure,
ANDI, which does not rely on the same parametric assumptions
as SDT (Yaniv et al. 1991). In addition, despite the asymmetry in
trial number (40 P-trials and 160 R-trials), due to an incentivized
elicitation mechanism each trial contributed equally to sub-
jects’ earnings in the task. Thus it is unlikely that motivational
differences between conditions can explain the discrepancy in
judgments of confidence. In addition, here we only consider
prospective judgments made before stimulus material pertain-
ing to the current decision has been experienced. In other
domains, subjects are able to form reliable single-trial prospec-
tive judgments such as feelings-of-knowing or judgments-of-
learning (Carlson 1993; Chua et al. 2009; Zhao and Linderholm
2011). It may be possible to augment the current task design to
more closely mimic those used in metamemory tasks, e.g. by
asking subjects to predict how well they will be able to discrimi-
nate an identical stimulus in a subsequent testing phase.
Conversely, it remains to be seen whether the trial-to-trial
dynamics of confidence observed here, such as the influence of
previous confidence on future predictions of performance, gen-
eralize to other metacognitive domains such as memory and
general knowledge.
Summary
To conclude, previous studies have typically focussed on ret-
rospective metacognitive judgments of perceptual decision-
making. Here we compare the construction of retrospective
and prospective confidence judgments within the same task
using repeated stimuli of constant difficulty. We find dissoci-
able influences on each judgment type: retrospective judg-
ments are strongly influenced by current-trial fluency and
accuracy and confidence in immediately preceding deci-
sions, whereas prospective judgments are influenced by pre-
vious confidence over a longer time window. In contrast,
global levels of confidence were correlated across judgments,
indicative of a domain-general overconfidence that tran-
scends temporal focus. Our findings extend the study of
metacognition of perception to prospective judgments, and
lay the groundwork for future studies of the neural basis of
prospective confidence.
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